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I. INTRODUCTION-THE PROBLEMS OF COMPARISON
This final contribution to our seminar is organized by themes,
not by countries. What we have been doing well for these two
days is creating the bricks of the foundation of comparison-a nec-
essary step in comparativism-without explicitly talking about
what it means to compare. And so to conclude our conference and
perhaps to add some mortar that makes these bricks stick to-
gether, I offer the following observations regarding comparison
and the things we have compared.
There exists a certain element of inevitability of comparison
when one studies foreign legal systems and laws. During our
seminar, Professor Ronald A. Brand explained that his compara-
tivist colleague at the University of Pittsburgh, Vivian G. Curran,
gradually has changed her lecture course title from "Introduction
to Comparative Law" to "Comparative Legal Studies" to "Civil
Law Systems" because, when working between entire families of
law-not just between different countries-she feels that the ele-
ment of comparison is so inherent that when a student in a com-
mon-law country studies a civil system, the word comparison
needs not be explicit in the title. Some dangers with treating
comparativism as inherent or implicit is that one may then treat
the act of comparison as an obvious set of operations and treat the
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of International Programs, Duquesne Uni-
versity School of Law, 600 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15282, U.S.A., telephone +1-412-
396-1047, facsimile +1-412-396-4014, junker@duq.edu. Professor Junker teaches and prac-




questions of comparative law as though they are already answered
and their answers agreed upon.
Within the discipline of comparative law, some debate exists to-
day between proponents of what is known as the functionalist ap-
proach and the proponents of what is known as the dialogic ap-
proach. I adopt the traditional functionalist approach from two of
the founders of the present discipline of comparative law, Konrad
Zweigert and Hein Kotz. In her Comparative Law: An Introduc-
tion,1 Curran made a valuable critique of the seminal work done
by Zweigert and Kbtz. 2 Zweigert and Kotz practiced their science
of legal comparativism in what we would today call the universal-
ist school by looking for similarities in different systems, "even
sometimes going so far as to view comparative law as the basis for
identifying the 'best' approach with the ultimate aim of securing
its universal adoption."3  Support for the universalist position
comes from the notion that all societies are trying to solve similar
problems within their respective legal systems.4 Curran's socio-
historical critique of that method is that the method puts the rab-
bit in the magician's hat-if one assumes that similarities exist,
either implicitly or explicitly, then one is, of course, going to find
similarities. As a thoughtful critic, she then asked why Zweigert
and Kotz assumed that similarities existed. According to Curran,
it was their own life experiences of an ideologically twisted politi-
cal regime-the National Socialist German Workers' Party (better
known as the "Nazis"). The Nazis put a different rabbit in the
hat-they assumed differences existed and consequently began
from that assumption when dehumanizing some humans to build
their natural and social "sciences."
Thus, it would seem that a root problem in comparative law is
that of building foundations that use blocks of unexamined as-
sumptions-either of similarity or of difference. Can we escape
from the conundrum of assuming that either similarities or differ-
ences may always be found when comparing two or more of any
phenomena? Not likely. Curran concluded that the solution,
therefore, in comparing a foreign legal culture to our own or an-
1. VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (Carolina Acad.
Press 2002).
2. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, Tony Weir,
trans. (Oxford 3d ed. 1998).
3. Christopher McCrudden, Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 371-98 (Esin Oriicei & David Nelken, eds., 2007).
4. See REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 34 (Kirk W.
Junker & P. Matthew Roy, trans., 10th ed. Carolina Acad. Press 2008).
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other is to immerse ourselves in that foreign legal culture in order
to understand it sufficiently on its own terms to avoid, to the ex-
tent possible, the need for assumptions and thus make a superior
comparison. 5 Of course, immersion is often not possible. To rem-
edy this practical difficulty ever so slightly, we have had the un-
common luxury during this seminar of bringing legal scholars
from elsewhere to us, rather than our needing to travel to nearly a
dozen other countries. But even when we do not have that option,
we should not stop practicing comparativism, albeit with extra
care. Some of the students or lawyers whom I teach have found
the following three levels of personal practice and engagement in
comparative study to be a helpful set of operating principles.
1. As a "tourist," the comparativist goes to another country
with his or her own values and lives in a real or metaphorical
tourist world of hotels, museums, public transportation, and
shopping.
2. As a "visitor," the comparativist goes to another culture
and takes part in the other culture's world as a visitor: gro-
ceries, family life, work, education, bureaucracy, and docu-
mentation are all parts of the visitor's life. He or she may
even own or rent a house and has, as a goal, to learn that cul-
ture, albeit from the outside.
3. As a "traveler," the comparativist goes to another culture
as at level 2, above, but the traveler then also asks the host
culture for its perspective of the traveler's own culture.
And if it is not possible for someone to travel at all in order to
immerse oneself, one can nevertheless practice comparativism as
a "reader" by going directly to the word only, without direct sense
experience, and reading the accounts of another culture's descrip-
tions of its own culture and the accounts of the reader's culture.
For these two days, by bringing a multitude of exceptional foreign
legal scholars to Duquesne University School of Law, the School of
Law has brought to the student and lawyer in Pittsburgh the
reader's opportunities of the best sort-those in which one can
also engage the foreign visitor directly, without needing to leave
home.
5. CURRAN, supra note 1.
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We shall have used this opportunity to question and be ques-
tioned, and to become conscious of the assumptions we have made,
and make them explicit and open for honest intellectual debate in
this public forum, rather than to proceed with assumptions that, if
left unexamined, may be shared by our interlocutors, but may just
as likely be understood differently or even refuted by our inter-
locutors.
II. WHY COMPARE?
Thus, we proceed, conscious of why we might want to make
comparisons. Why indeed do we compare the various receptions of
the legal concepts of separation of powers among the states repre-
sented here-Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica,
Mexico, the United States, Canada, Macedonia, and Germany?
With what specific assumptions do we begin the comparison? Are
we assuming similarities or assuming differences? At the core, it
would, of course, appear that we are assuming similarities-after
all, we have styled the title of the seminar as "Separation of Pow-
ers in the Americas . . . and Beyond," a title that suggests to the
audience that each of the states has some operative notion of
separation of powers. Even if the notions differ from state to
state, some similarity must be assumed in the interpretation of
the phrase separation of powers in order to support the inclusion
of each state's position in this seminar.
In fact, history will show that, in some instances, states did ex-
plicitly borrow legal concepts from other states when drafting con-
stitutions or establishing institutions. In discussing the separa-
tion of powers in Brazil, Professor Keith S. Rosenn noted that his-
tory was necessary for understanding the comparison. (He also
tied this seminar to our last seminar by pointing out that federal-
ism, the topic of our 2007 seminar, is itself an aspect of the sepa-
ration of powers.) The Brazilian Constitution was modeled on the
Spanish Constitution and the Weimar Constitution of 1934. So, a
first and perhaps most obvious answer to the question of "why
compare?" is to borrow ideas learned from other cultures, even in
public law, in order to perhaps improve our own systems.
Zweigert and Kotz themselves adapted their position from that of
Rudolph von Jhering, from whom they quote the famous state-
ment:
The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of
nationality but of usefulness and need. No one bothers to
950 Vol. 47
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fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at
home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just because it
didn't grow in his back garden.
6
We were warned no fewer than three times during the seminar,
however, by Professors Rosenn and Brand and also by Professor
Alejandro Miguel Garro of Argentina that ideas from different cul-
tures do not move to another culture without undergoing some
change, intended or not, just as when one translates a word from
one language to another. Professor Garro noted that, whereas
procurator general is a proper but relatively unknown translation
into English of one of the Brazilian executive offices, it would be
wrong to make it the more familiar American English term attor-
ney general, because that person is a member of the cabinet. He
further noted that it would be equally as wrong to call that person
the solicitor general. To extend the point, Professor Rosenn sug-
gested that American public law does not have an English expres-
sion for coup d'tat for the reason that it is not a phenomenon that
has ever occurred in the United States, and therefore U.S. Ameri-
cans have never had to put a name to it. On a more negative note,
although for the same reasons, Rosenn also pointed out that there
is no word for accountability in Portuguese or Spanish.
Why else compare? One could be so dramatic as to answer "to
prevent war." In the congenial atmosphere of this seminar, we
might want to say that war among our respective states will not
happen. Yet, simply among the states represented here, the
United States has been at war on separate occasions against Mex-
ico, Germany, parts of Yugoslavia (though not Macedonia), and
British-provincial Canada. Of course, within Latin America, there
have also been a number of wars.
One might also compare so as to avoid tyranny. When powers
are not separated, one might find it easier to make such state-
ments as those of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela: "I am the
law; I am the state."7 By contrast, regarding the United States,
John Adams famously stated in 1776 that we are "a nation of
laws, not of men." Indeed, it would seem that by separating the
powers of the executive branch from the powers of the legislative
branch, constitutional systems like that of the United States
6. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, 1 GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS 8 (Benno Schwabe, Basel
9th ed., 1955) (1852), reprinted in ZWEIGERT AND KOTZ, supra note 2, at 17.
7. Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Address at the Duquesne University School of Law, Sepa-
ration of Powers in the Americas ... and Beyond (Nov. 7, 2008).
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would make it impossible, or at least unconstitutional, to equate
the existence of the state with a person. Professor Robert S.
Barker reminded us in his opening remarks in the seminar pro-
gram that Thomas Jefferson "observed that the concentration of
all governmental power in the same hands is the very definition of
despotism."8  Thus, one clear advantage to understanding and
practicing the separation of powers, which one may well assume is
enhanced through comparative study, is to avoid tyranny.
And finally, as an echo of my levels of engagement for the com-
parativist, as listed above, a final reason that I offer as to why we
might not only want to compare, but also why we might find that
we need to compare, is one that I borrow from the comparative
study of modern languages. Anyone who has ever attempted to
study a second or third language generally will acknowledge that
in the process, he or she learns more about his or her mother lan-
guage than had been known before. The reasons are that one
learns a second language from the rules-from rules of grammar,
syntax, punctuation, spelling, and usage. But one learns his first
language simply by practicing it and being in the constant use of
it, without the opportunity, and one might even say the ability, to
step back and observe, question, and reflect upon the language's
different structures, parts, and functions.
III. How Do WE COMPARE?
From addressing the question of why we compare, we turn to
the question of how we go about comparing. Like other social dis-
ciplines (e.g., literature) and professions (e.g., medicine, architec-
ture), law can be studied comparatively. If we are studying law
comparatively here, we should take advantage of what the meth-
ods of the comparative disciplines have revealed. While we did
not suggest that we follow any prescriptive formula in presenting
the national reports of the seminar, the comparative method pro-
vides a helpful structure by which to go back and review the pres-
entations and our discussions. With due respect to the critiques of
Curran, Teitel (infra), and others, I shall nevertheless maintain
the position held by so many that the work of Zweigert and Kotz
presents what one might call the "orthodoxy" of comparative legal
study. In recognizing that the study of law in general, and com-
8. Separation of Powers Program 3 (Nov. 7, 2008).
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parative law in particular, is clearly a social science for Zweigert
and Kotz, we might therefore begin with an hypothesis. 9
But before we do, as a preliminary measure, one must be clear
about whether he or she is conducting a macrocomparison or a
microcomparison. According to Zweigert and Kotz, a macrocom-
parison concerns the spirit and style of different legal systems and
the methods and thought of those systems.10 For example, one
could study different techniques of legislation, styles of codifica-
tion, methods of statutory interpretation, the authority of prece-
dents, and the contributions of scholars to the system of law. A
microcomparison concerns specific problems instead, and therefore
studies the rules used to solve those problems or conflicts. Alloca-
tion of loss in a traffic accident, manufacturer liability, and rules
determining child custody are a few examples of microcompari-
son.1' Our seminar has presented macrocomparison. But even
with macrocomparison, "[o]ne can speak of comparative law only if
there are specific comparative reflections on the problem to which
the work is devoted."'12 Through the speakers' texts, oral presen-
tations, and the questions and answers with the audience and
speakers, a set of common macrocomparative themes began to
emerge from our speakers' reflections, such as what the separation
of state powers does and does not accomplish. One may consider
Montesquieu's tripartite system of separation of state powers to be
prevalent, 13 but new and administrative separations whose lines
of separation are not those of Montesquieu may be more the rule
than the exception. Professor Luis Fernando Solano Carrera
noted well the role, context, and limits of Montesquieu's distinc-
tions. In addition to the benefits of separating the powers of the
state, there are benefits to keeping some functions together. What
tools are necessary to enable the separation of state powers? And
finally, what is the role of virtue in achieving the goals of justice
and good governance through the separation of state powers?
After these preliminary matters are dispensed, Zweigert and
K6tz proceed to lay out a method for conducting a proper compari-
son. 14 They say we should first lay out the essentials of the rele-
9. ZWEIGERT AND K6TZ, supra note 2, at 34.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 6.
13. CHARLES-LoUIS DE SECONDAT & CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Prometheus Books 2002) (1748).
14. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 2, at 34.
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vant foreign law, country by country, 15 much as we did in organiz-
ing this seminar as presentations of the law of separation of pow-
ers, country by country. A cautionary flag pops up again, how-
ever. In his Grammar of Motives, 16 Kenneth Burke maintains
that all comparison leads to hierarchy. In applying Burke's asser-
tions to our seminar, I would like to take a step back and add a
note, reminding myself of something even prior: that all listing
and categorization leads to comparison. When we put these two
cautionary tales together, we see that when we list and categorize
legal systems and their inclusion or omission of varying notions of
separating the powers of the state, we are inevitably comparing,
and if we then take Burke's admonition seriously, we are cau-
tioned that we will inevitably create a hierarchy. Thus, we need
to be conscious of the hierarchies we create and be able to defend
and explain them. But these cautions should not deter the stu-
dent or the scholar, because just as it is said that a person who
knows only one religion, knows none, or who knows only one lan-
guage, knows none, so too the student or scholar who knows only
one legal system, knows none.
After laying out the essentials of the relevant countries,
Zwiegert and Kotz build a system through syntax and a vocabu-
lary that is capable of discussing the essential building blocks. 17
This step proved to be a more difficult task during our seminar
than one might have first imagined. Historically, practitioners
have tried to circumvent this problem by reference to a common
ancient language, such as Latin, or a common modern language,
such as French. But as an astute observer in our seminar's audi-
ence noted, even the term separation of powers in American Eng-
lish inherently cannot have an exact cognate in another culture
with another language. The audience member asked whether the
same foundational legal document in five different countries es-
sentially meant there were five different systems, and our distin-
guished panel unanimously agreed that the answer must be "yes."
Legal translators can tell us the same, despite the legal fiction at
the end of a treaty that says that several different languages can
each claim to be an official version of the treaty. This revelation
would be consistent with what is known as the pluralist school of
comparative law, in which one identifies what is different between
jurisdictions, stresses the need for understanding the local con-
15. Id. at 6.
16. KENNETH BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (Univ. of Cal. Press 1969) (1945).
17. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 2, at 44.
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text, and emphasizes the notion that "even when similar concepts
are being used across jurisdictions, they may not necessarily play
the same role in each."' 8 I will return to some applications of plu-
ralism a bit later.
In a recent seminar in comparative law of Europe, I required
the students (some of whom are in our seminar's audience) to take
a short piece of legal text from another country, translate it, and
then provide me with the original, the translation, and a narrative
of their translation experience. They were free to use any tools
they wished, and many turned to online translators to do the work
for them, which I allowed, thinking I knew in advance what that
exercise would likely yield. "There is no valid way to piece to-
gether this information to make a valid English sentence," was
one comment. Another offered: "I used a three-step process to
perform the translation from German to English. First, I entered
each word individually into LEO. 19 LEO provided a list of poten-
tial English word equivalents. The number of English word
equivalents ranged approximately from five to more than twenty-
five. I selected the three English word equivalents that I thought
were most likely to be correct." A third student explained:
Once I had successfully translated the terms, I attempted to
understand the English sentences I had created. [ ...] A dis-
connect between German and English grammar rules fre-
quently required the addition or omission of words for the
English translation to be grammatically correct and easily
understood by the reader. [ ...] Anything less than fluency in
both languages would make this process challenging, and, in
a way, dangerous to attempt.
These valuable experiences for the students helped them to see
the fallacy in thinking that comparison can be conducted by a me-
chanical one-to-one word translation.
As lawyers, we like to have our own technical terms and techni-
cal definitions, the mastery of which, and the shared common use
of which, give us the license to practice law. This shared common
usage is essential to understanding the meaning of the words.
Shared common usage creates boundaries of meaning that are
constantly negotiated, thus frustrating the mechanical sense of
18. McCRUDDEN, supra note 3, at 374-75.




one-to-one word translation to a different language. Take, for ex-
ample, our featured term separation of powers-a term that is not
even stated, let alone defined, in the U.S. Constitution, as Judge
D. Brooks Smith of the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals re-
minded us. Smith says that Alexander Hamilton spoke instead of
the "utility of the union to prosper." Understood dialectically,
separation of powers means the powers are not found together,
right? Absent separation, where would the powers otherwise be-
all in the executive or all in the legislature or all in the courts?
What is included among the powers to be separated? What else
should be part of the understanding of the "powers"? How does
separation of powers serve different cultures differently? It may
serve the common law, constituted by a history of experience, ac-
cording to Holmes, 20 differently than it serves the civil law, which
wants to treat law as a social science of deductions from norms.
As Judge Smith noted, the powers of the state may well not be
really all that separate, but just under different foci at different
times. In a similar vein, an audience member also offered that the
separation of powers is a continuum, not discrete chunks.
There are practical consequences for these language difficulties.
Picking up on what Professors Garro and Rosenn said earlier
about the connection of the existence of terms for accountability,
coup d'gtat, and procurator general, Professor Brand maintained
that admonitions to the "rule of law" (as with the European Un-
ion's Copenhagen Criteria or with U.S. foreign policy) do not work
because we cannot agree upon a concrete cross-cultural definition
for "rule of law." Difficulties in an agreed-upon definition in re-
cent years for the word terrorism have presented stumbling blocks
to international treaty agreements as well. Brand feels the same
is true for separation of powers.
But perhaps separation of powers means different things to dif-
ferent people in different times and different places because it is a
legal concept attempting to meet different needs. The separation
of powers has metamorphosed from Montesquieu's three to Bra-
zil's four (or five) to a different five in the European Union. Pro-
fessor Rosenn pointed out, for example, that, in addition to Mon-
tesquieu's tripartite branches, the military in Brazil has always
regarded itself as the guardian of the constitution and, as such, a
fourth branch of government. Furthermore, originally the Em-
20. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (Little Brown Company, 40th ed. 1946) (1881).
956 Vol. 47
The Inherent Role of Translation
peror was both chief executive and "moderator," a fourth or fifth
branch of government. Professors Kay Windthorst and Saso
Georgievski added that, aside from the European Court of Justice
(and its Court of First Instance), the institutions of the European
Union government do not follow the tripartite model. The Parlia-
ment, Council, and Commission all share parts of both the legisla-
tive functions and executive functions, depending upon what sub-
stantive powers of the constitutive treaties are being called upon.
Instead, the identity of each of the three is determined more by
the constituency to whom it is responsible. Thus, the Commission
is responsible to the Union as an independent legal entity, the
Council members remain responsible to their respective home
countries, and the Parliamentarians are each responsible to the
citizens of Europe on the whole, not to the citizens of any one
country. This realignment scrambles the tripartite system and
realigns it to structure a different form of government to meet dif-
ferent needs of the people than does Montesquieu's tripartite ver-
sion of separation.
After laying out the essentials of the relevant foreign law, coun-
try by country, Zweigert and Kotz admonish us to use these essen-
tials as a basis for critical comparison, 21 all the while minding
what they call the functionality principle.22 The functionality
principle cautions the comparativist not to compare similar things
that nevertheless have different functions. Comparison must be
for things that function the same, although they may look differ-
ent. Thus, if one finds that different countries meet the same
need in different ways, one must ask why.23 One might describe
functionalism as "an approach that 'treats comparative law as a
technique of problem solving."' 24 Further, "functionalism consid-
ers 'the relevant unit of analysis' not as 'a geographic entity, such
as a country or region, but . . . rather the problem and its legal
solution."' 25 With functionalism, the subject of comparative analy-
sis is the legal problem, excised from its context. The German le-
gal philosopher Reinhold Zippelius applied functionalism to sepa-
ration of powers in the civil-law tradition:
21. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 2, at 6.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 44.
24. MCCRUDDEN, supra note 3, at 374 (citing Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional
Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570, 2574 (2004) (book review)).
25. Id. at 374-75 (citing Teitel, supra note 24, at 2584).
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Pursuant to the principles of separation of powers and legal
certainty, it follows that the law sets general norms that are
binding upon administration and adjudication. Accordingly,
administrative and judicial bodies must determine as a mat-
ter of principle, and according to rules of interpretation, what
the intent of these norms are; and, in so doing, they must
abide by that intent. At the same time, however, considera-
tion must also be given to the principle function of the law in
providing just solutions to problems.26
There are at least two critiques of functionalism, however: plu-
ralism (previously mentioned) and the dialogic method of com-
parativism. Ruti Teitel and others feel the dialogic method is
more contemporary and responds to 'the present context of a
globalizing politics."' 27 Particularly in the context of comparative
constitutionalism, the dialogical approach focuses on the processes
of constitutional interpretation. "Comparative exchange is not
bound in path-dependent or hierarchic ways. Rather, it poses a
comity-based 'transjudicial[ ]' enterprise-a decentered view of
constitutional practices deriving from pluralist sources, with the
possibility of 'cross fertilization."'
28
IV. WHAT RESULTED FROM THE COMPARISONS?
One of the advantages of macrocomparison is the comparison of
the various legal practitioners within any given system. It is not
only the substantive law that creates and maintains a separation
of powers, but also the training and professional activities of the
various legal practitioners within the systems that are important.
In addition to legislators, governors, and judges, Professor Ken
Gormley pointed out, for example, that we need to add the role of
independent counsel. To that, I would also add advocates, admin-
istrative agents, and even the media (as the so-called fourth es-
tate), if for nothing else, for identifying and reminding us which
judges were appointed by whom. In fact, it occurs to me that per-
haps another way out of our conundrum of assumptions in com-
paring would be to compare concrete social phenomena in the law
rather than abstract legal concepts. For example, one can make a
comparative legal study of the education and training of persons
26. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 4, at xi.
27. MCCRUDDEN, supra note 3, at 375 (citing Teitel, supra note 24, at 2584).
28. Teitel, supra note 24, at 2586 (brackets in original) (internal citations omitted).
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in a legal system. How many hours do they work? What is the
male-to-female ratio? What powers do the various types of legal
actors have in the system? What is the relationship of the mili-
tary or the political actors to the legal actors? This study may, in
some sense, be thwarted by the U.S. American notion that, as a
nation of laws, not of men, we are intent upon equating justice
with a science of abstract principles rather than one of socially
observable phenomena. As a counterfactual example, Professor
Saso Georgievski of Macedonia pointed out that, since independ-
ence, it has been precisely when the Republic of Macedonia has
failed to separate the powers of the state that the state has been
at its weakest.
Another recurring theme that emerged during our seminar was
that of judicial independence. Professor Solano Carrera empha-
sized the connection between the independence of judges and the
functioning of the rule of law. In order for powers of state to be
successfully separate, each branch needs sufficient power of its
own to remain independent, not as a matter of constitutional legal
theory, but-especially in the case of the judiciary-from undue
influence by economics, politics, or the media. Judge D. Brooks
Smith, who himself has spent considerable time lecturing abroad
and examining the comparison of the U.S. judiciary with other
countries, feels that it is essential to know the nuances of how
persons are made judges and what their particular functions may
be, and that, therefore, the U.S. should not export U.S. ideas of
judicial review. Judge Smith suggested, and the seminar nearly
unanimously agreed, that for the judiciary to remain independent,
it is necessary that judges receive life tenure and sufficient pay,
and not simply be called "independent" or "separate" by the consti-
tution. The question was then raised as to whether one can de-
termine the amount of sufficient pay a priori, or only know that a
system has failed to do so when enough judges have begun to ac-
quire money through other means. Forty dollars per month is ob-
viously not sufficient, as Professor Rosenn noted, but what is?
How is "enough" determined? It would seem that "enough" is not
determined scientifically nor uniformly, but culturally, through
the expectations about the worth of a judge and the cost of what it
means to live like a judge. Professor Rosenn maintained that
these expectations were characteristically lower for judges in the
civil-law tradition than judges in the common-law tradition.
Returning to the statement made by Hugo Chavez, President of
Venezuela, "I am the law; I am the state," Professor Allan R.
Brewer-Carias noted that, although a system of checks and bal-
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ances cannot allow an individual to claim to have all the powers of
the state, the rule of law need not be equivalent to the elimination
of the person. Participants agreed and arrived at the notion that,
since the Enlightenment, it is true that legal power, in theory, be-
gins with the individual person, but the rule of law must balance
that power. This role of the individual then evolved as the semi-
nar progressed, and we eventually arrived at the notion that the
public virtue of the individual is also an essential ingredient to
keep powers of government separated from each other. Indeed,
Judge Smith maintained that the degree to which a constitution
works is dependent upon the virtue of the individual persons who
will be applying it. Again calling upon his experiences in Eastern
Europe, Judge Smith insisted that public virtue is necessary and
cannot be fully replaced simply by a constitution that separates
powers and then places checks and balances among the separated
branches carrying out those powers. Professor Bruce Antkowiak
quoted James Madison as having insisted that "[i]n a republic, one
must cultivate virtue," thereby noting that a republic must be
more than a free market. But how does the legal system act to
cultivate virtue? "First of all, you need a strong, homogenous civil
society," answered Dr. Jos6 Gamas Torruco.
The Immediate Past President of the Inter-American Bar Asso-
ciation, Renaldy J. Gutierrez, also in reference to the tactics and
politics of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, maintained that
"populism is a threat because it attracts people with illusions."
While this remark may have largely been in reference to Chavez,
it does address the question raised earlier of how expectations or
illusions are created. But this question brought us again back to
personal virtue. Duquesne University President Charles Dough-
erty noted in the seminar's program that the question of cultivat-
ing virtue is a question at least as old as ancient Greek society.
The ancient Greek word ar~te is typically translated as "virtue."
Records indicate that, already by the fifth and fourth centuries
B.C., ar~te as applied to men had developed to include quieter vir-
tues, such as dikaiosyne (justice) and sophorosyne (self-restraint).
But by the time Plato and Aristotle reflected upon the issue in the
fourth century, they had located justice among politics, not laws.
Unfortunately, in today's U.S. American legal education, we often
tacitly leave justice to politics as well, and in law, we train stu-
dents to treat justice as a low-level policy argument. I often tell
the story of having invited a hydrogeologist to lecture to my envi-
ronmental law students on the technical science behind a particu-
lar set of regulations. Having never sat through a lecture in law,
960 Vol. 47
The Inherent Role of Translation
she asked me prior to her lecture, 'What kinds of things do you
discuss in law school?" I told her about torts and contracts and
civil procedure and tax and so forth. She replied, "No, I mean
what kinds of issues-for instance, do you talk about justice?" I
laughed and said she would be addressing upper-level students,
and that by the time they are upper-level, they will have been
trained not to use that argument. Sure enough, after her lecture,
I invited students to analyze why some water-quality cases had
been decided as they had been. "Judicial efficiency" was one an-
swer; "balancing of interests" was another. "How about justice?" I
offered. A third of the 25 students present laughed audibly. My
hydrogeologist guest was aghast.
Having catalogued the issues of separation of powers that were
raised by the various national reports, I now turn to the final
analysis of whether these tools offered for comparison in our cata-
logue can, put together or singly, lead to justice and good govern-
ance. First, I am reminded of the limits of the separation of pow-
ers. As Judge Smith noted, the separation of state powers, as an
area of substantive law, is not just about the maintenance of sepa-
ration but is also about what happens when the several branches
of the state interact. Here, one is reminded that even the creator
of reductionist positivism, Auguste Comte, said that, while his
positive philosophy would drive us to reduce questions to speciali-
zations, and then all specializations to mathematics, at the end of
the specializations, a generalist is needed to hold it all together. 29
Dr. Kay Windthorst of Germany offered many examples from the
structure of the separation in the government of the Federal Re-
public of Germany that demonstrated separate organs with sepa-
rate functions that nevertheless complemented rather than com-
peted in the power structure. Furthermore, although we focus at
this seminar on the separation of powers, we must keep in mind
that the principle of the separation of state powers alone is not a
panacea; it will not eradicate war, poverty, or any of the ills of
humanity, as we were reminded by John D. Richard, Chief Justice
of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada. It may indeed be a nec-
essary condition for justice and good governance, but it alone is
not sufficient. Here, I am reminded of something further that
Reinhold Zippelius said:
29. AUGUSTE COMTE, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY
(Paul Descours & H. Gordon Jones trans., 1905) (1851).
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The function of the law in offering solutions capable of attain-
ing consensus to questions of justice can also, however, come
into conflict with the strict obligation of the law. That hap-
pens when the statute, as interpreted according to the rules of
the art, apparently does not satisfy its function in serving jus-
tice. When, in such a case, the grounds for doing justice out-
weigh the grounds for separation of powers and legal cer-
tainty-which speak for the strict adherence to the wording of
the statute-then supplementing or correcting the statute is
necessary.
30
I am also reminded that another theme to emerge, and also one
that was determined to be necessary-but not alone sufficient-to
maintain the separation of state powers, is a system of checks and
balances among the branches. Judge Smith maintained that
separation of powers is as much about balance and interdepend-
ence as it is about separation, however. In support of his point,
Smith noted that every year, members of the Congress raise con-
stitutional amendment bills, usually in response to some perceived
incorrect judicial interpretation, but the vast majority of those
bills is not, of course, ever passed.
Finally, I come full circle in combining the method of Zweigert
and Kotz in this seminar comparing the separation of powers in
various systems with the goal of justice, 31 and I arrive back at the
critique of Zweigert and Kotz offered by Vivian G. Curran. But
now, I am also reminded of the work of James Boyd White that
ties virtue to translation. In building upon the importance of per-
sonal virtue by judges, media, and citizens in maintaining separa-
tion of powers, we arrived at the unique problems presented in
doing so within a comparative framework. The comparative
framework demands translation of the most obvious kind, but
within the obvious acts of translation, many subtle substantive
points are made. "[I]t is only too typical that the 'content' of any
medium blinds us to the character of the medium," noted Marshall
McLuhan. 32 In Justice as Translation,33 James Boyd White said:
30. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 4, at xi.
31. According to Zweigert and Kotz, justice is the goal of the comparativist. ZWEIGERT
& KOTZ, supra note 2, at 47.
32. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 24 (Sig-
net Books 1964).
33. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM (Univ. of Chicago 1990).
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While there are some situations where translation seems as a
practical matter to work well enough, there are others where
it is in any full sense plainly impossible: think of translating
a poem, for example, or a political speech, or an expression of
love, from one language to another. In such cases[,] the very
activity of translation brings us again and again to face that
which is particular or unique to the language and its context,
to the speaker himself, and therefore cannot be translated,
cannot be "set over," into another. Even to attempt to trans-
late is to experience necessary but instructive failure. In this
sense[,] translation forces us to respect the other-the other
language, the other person, the other text-yet it nonetheless
requires us to assert ourselves, and our own languages, in re-
lation to it. It requires us to create a frame that includes both
self and other, both familiar and strange; in this I believe it
can serve as a model for all ethical and political thought.
34
An essential component of comparison is translation. Transla-
tion may mean the obvious sense of translating one modern lan-
guage to another, but it may also mean the more subtle task of
translating the "foreign" meaning of something that appears in
the same modern language as the audience is using. When we do
the former, we may act as though we are not doing the latter; that
is to say, we may act as though it is possible to conduct a one-to-
one translation from one spoken or written language to another
and create the same meaning. That, of course, is impossible, and
much has been written in the fields of translation studies and lin-
guistics on that weak assumption and its ensuing problems. But
it is through this more obvious sense of translation that we come
to the subtly powerful translation assumptions of equating one
culture with another, once we have "equated" them through a
common modern language. And this brings us back to the macro-
comparison problem that we addressed in this seminar: Does
separation of powers mean the same thing in one country with its
own language, such as Brazil, as it does in another country with
its own languages, such as Canada?
V. CONCLUSIONS
What might be the future for the separation of powers? In re-
flecting upon the separation of powers in the Republic of Mace-
34. WHITE, supra note 33, at xvii.
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donia and the Federal Republic of Germany, Professors Saso
Georgievski and Kay Windthorst, each respectively noted that the
impact upon their countries is felt in the way in which the Euro-
pean Union's governance separates the powers of government.
This is perhaps the largest and strongest departure from Montes-
quieu's tripartite division of the functions of the state over and
against those of the individual citizen. Zweigert and Kotz ulti-
mately wanted theirs to be a pragmatic enterprise, perhaps bely-
ing their universalist tendencies, and thus they prescribed that
the comparativist conclude with the proper policy for the law to
adopt, a process which may involve a reinterpretation of one's own
legal system.35 Beyond the mechanics of juxtaposition, even for
Zwiegert and Kotz, other considerations are required as well. For
example, as was already discussed under the rubric of macrocom-
parison, one is not to confine his or her comparisons to substantive
law36 but is also to portray the way in which the law is created and
applied, the style of judgments, and the training and professional
activities of the various legal practitioners within the systems.
37
With this framework in mind, and the lessons learned about the
inability to translate concepts from one culture to another, the
future might well look in the direction of new separations, such as
those in the European Union. The example of Europe also offers a
way in which to allow for a healthy degree of independence and
autonomy due to the inability to entirely translate one culture to
another.
35. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 2, at 6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 30.
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